I&C upgrades are often necessary to ensure continued
safe and reliable operation. However, a
number of unsettled technical and regulatory issues continue to hinder I&C
modernization efforts. In some cases
existing regulatory guidance is being reassessed, and issues once considered
resolved have been reopened. Updates to
key sections of the NRC’s Standard Review Plan are now in development, but the
specifics are largely unknown. This session will address some of the key
technical issues and areas of regulatory uncertainty and risk that affect
digital upgrades at operating plants and will affect license approvals for new
plants.
Specific topics include safety system actuation setpoints,
human factors considerations for new control rooms, new I&C architectures
that use advanced technologies, the latest thinking on the software common-mode
failure issue and diversity and defense-in-depth requirements, and the
applicability of risk-informed approaches to digital equipment. Discussion will emphasize activities that
might be undertaken by the various stakeholders (utilities, EPRI, NEI, and NRC)
to resolve the open issues sooner and more efficiently, so that they don’t
result in crippling delays for future operating plant modernization programs
and new plant license approvals.
P054-“Addressing I&C Issues for New Nuclear Plant Deployment”
Layla Sandell, Ray Torok, EPRI
The
P044-“Risk-Informed
Evaluations of Nuclear Power Plant Digital Upgrades Technical and Regulatory
Issues”
David Blanchard, Applied Reliability Engineering
An area of technical and regulatory uncertainty in the
implementation of digital upgrades at nuclear power plants is the application
of risk-informed techniques to the evaluation of the design of a digital
upgrade. All nuclear power plants have plant specific probabilistic risk
assessments (PRAs) [1] with which risk-informed analyses are routinely
performed in the operation, maintenance and licensing of the plants. Furthermore, NRC policy is to increase the
use of PRA in all regulatory matters to the extent supported by the state of
the art in order to complement existing deterministic and defense-in-depth
approaches as well as reduce unnecessary regulatory burden [2].
However, developed prior the completion of the plant specific
PRAs, current regulatory guidance with respect to evaluation and review of
digital upgrade design [3] remains largely deterministic and does not yet take
advantage of risk insights that can be derived from the PRAs. In this paper,
the following questions will be addressed with respect to the use of risk
insights in the implementation of a nuclear power plant digital upgrade:
·
What technical issues are barriers to the use of PRA in the
evaluation of the risks associated with a digital upgrade?
·
What kinds of risk insights can be derived from a plant specific
PRA using existing techniques that are useful in support of licensing a digital
upgrade?
·
What do these risk insights say regarding the effectiveness of
existing deterministic regulatory guidance in managing safety in the
implementation of a digital upgrade?
·
How can these risk insights be used to reduce regulatory
uncertainties?
[1] Generic Letter 88-20 "Independent Plant Examination for
Severe Accident Vulnerabilities", USNRC, November 23, 1988.
[2] "Use of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Methods in Nuclear
Regulatory Activities", Federal Register Vol. 60 pg. 42622, August 16,
1995.
[3] Branch Technical Position HICB-19, “Guidance for Evaluation of
Defense-in-Depth and Diversity in Digital Computer-Based Instrumentation and
Control Systems”.
P045-“The
Functionality of Instrument Loops and How That Can Be Determined”
Robert Fredricksen, EXELON Nuclear
The expectations from the regulator as to what is required for
compliance with 10CFR50.36 with regard to Limiting Safety System Settings and
the surveillance activities that will be required to support these new expectations
to ensure compliance will have an impact on the majority of the operating
nuclear power reactors in the United States. This paper will address the
revised expectations and what are the deviances from the present industry
practices. It will address some additional actions that will be required to
comply with these new expectations and identify what areas may still be subject
to disagreements
P046-“Control
Room and Human-System Interface Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plant
Modernization Programs”
Joseph Naser, EPRI
Several nuclear power plants are starting instrumentation and
control (I&C) modernization programs using digital equipment to address
obsolescence issues and the need to improve plant performance, while
maintaining high levels of safety. As an
integral part of the I&C modernization program, the control room and other
human-system interfaces (HSIs) are also being modernized. A project, jointly funded by the Electric
Power Research Institute and the U.S. Department of Energy, has developed guidance
that will facilitate specification, design, implementation, operations,
maintenance, training, and licensing activities for control rooms and HSIs.
This guidance is actually 35 sets of guidelines in five
areas. These five areas are guidance for:
1) control room modernization planning, 2) human factors engineering (HFE)
design, analysis and tools, 3) HFE guidelines, 4) regulatory and licensing
activities, and 5) special topics related to operations and maintenance. The application of these guidelines will help
to reduce the likelihood of human errors and licensing risk, to gain maximum
benefit of implemented technology, and to increase performance. The guidance is intended for application by
utilities, vendors/suppliers, and third party integrators of modernization
activities. However, most of the
guidance applies to new plant design as well.
Many of the guidelines are already being used by several utilities. Several sections of these guidelines have
already been used successfully by utilities.
This paper provides a description of the guidelines project and the
guidelines. It does not specifically
discuss the licensing implications of the aspects of the guidance that
addresses design and process elements that will receive regulatory scrutiny. Examples of these are the acceptance of the
graded approach to HFE, appropriate approach to determine the minimum inventory
of fixed position and continuously available indicators and controls,
appropriate technical and regulatory requirements for qualified HSIs for
accident mitigation, display evaluation, soft controls, computerized
procedures, automation, etc., and appropriate criteria to be applied to assure
appropriate teamwork between operating crew members and between automation and
operators.
P020-”Human-Machine
Interface Evaluation”
Rachel Vail,
It has been approximately
20 years since the majority of human factors engineering evaluations of the
commercial nuclear power plant control room were performed. Many technological advances have been made in
the look-and-feel, usability and reliability of the nuclear control room
human-system interface (HSI) in the past two decades. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has
updated is design and evaluation process, NUREG-0700, several times to provide
a systematic method for evaluating the HSI design for control rooms. NUREG-0700
is required for both HSI design submittals prepared by licensees or applicants
for a license or new design certification of commercial nuclear power plants.
NUREG-0700 added approximately 600 new requirements to the most recent revision
of NUREG-0700 and brings the total requirements to over 2000.
Performing the human factors engineering review manually of an
entire control room or even a major modification is a time consuming
process. Major changes to NUREG-0700
(Rev. 2) will be highlighted and a method will be discussed to streamline the
HSI review process.
Presentation
of these papers will be followed by a panel discussion, started with a brief
presentation by Allan Howe on the NRC’s Perspective on the Evolving Technical
and Regulatory Environment
Allan Howe, I&C Branch Chief, NRR, Nuclear Regulatory
Commission